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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANTS UNDERTOOK TO WARN AGAINST A LIST OF 
SPECIFIC UNSAFE LIGHTING METHODS BUT DID NOT INCLUDE THE METHOD 
EMPLOYED BY MR. MUIR ON THAT LIST OF UNSAFE METHODS RAISES A JURY 
QUESTION AS TO THE ADEQUACY OF THE WARNING. 
Page 2 0 of the Brief of W. H. Burt and Pages 12 and 13 of 
the Brief of Apache rely on the following written instructions 
and warnings provided to Mrs. Muir's late husband: 
LIGHTING SAFETY FUSE 
Step l: Make sure you can reach a safe 
location after lighting with sufficient time 
before initiation. 
Step 2: Place sufficient stemming over the 
explosive material to protect it from fuse-
generated heat and sparks. 
Step 3: Have a partner before lighting the 
fuse. One person should light the fuse, and 
the other should time and monitor the burn. 
Step 4: Light the safety fuse, using a 
specially designed lighter: 
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Single-fuse ignition - hot wire 
lighters, pull-wire lighters or thermalite 
connectors. 
Multiple-fuse ignition - igniter cord 
with thermalite connectors. 
* Always light fuse with a fuse lighter 
designed for the purpose. 
* Always use the "buddy system" when 
lighting safety fuse - one lights the fuse, 
the other times and monitors. 
. . . . 
* Never use matches, cigarette lighters, 
cigarettes, pipes, cigars, carbide lamps, or 
other unsafe means to ignite safety fuse. 
The jury question is not whether or not these written 
instructions were given to Mr. Muir, but whether the explosives 
industry as a whole, in promulgating these instructions, 
negligently omitted to warn against the use of spitter fuse as a 
lighter when using explosives. 
While the industry instructions warn never to use "matches, 
cigarette lighters, cigarettes, pipes, cigars, carbide lamps, or 
other unsafe means to ignite safety fuse," the use of spitter 
fuse as a lighter is not prohibited and is conspicuously absent 
from the list. 
Douglas Bailey testified during Plaintiff's case in chief as 
a witness who had been present at the site of the explosion 
utilizing the "buddy system" who personally experienced the blast 
that killed Mr. Muir and injured Mr. Bailey. He was also called 
to testify as an expert blaster and was treated as such in 
questioning by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants. 
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The following key testimony came into evidence during the 
Plaintiffs case in chief as Mr. Bailey was cross examined 
concerning the above referenced instructions and warnings. 
Q. And I don't see anywhere, do you, 
where it says spitter fuse is an approved 
lighter? 
A. It don't say it's not approved. 
Q. It lists those things that are 
approved, doesn't it? 
A. But it don't say this is not 
approved, does it? 
(R. 1469) 
While Mr. Bailey is obviously not an expert in the proper 
grammatical use of the word "don't" in the English language, he 
was treated as a blasting expert by both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendants at the trial, and clearly testifies during the case in 
chief that there was a failure by Defendants to warn against the 
use of spitter fuse as a lighter. 
Mrs. Muir's deceased husband was not an experienced blaster. 
He was a baker who was using the explosives in his weekend 
treasure hunting hobby activities. It is for a lay jury of his 
peers to decide whether the instructions promulgated by the 
explosives industry which failed to expressly warn against the 
use of spitter fuse for lighting were adequate to warn and 
instruct a lay person such as Mr. Muir not to use a spitter. 
The absence of warning and the testimony of Mr. Bailey are 
both evidence in the record that must be examined in the light 
most favorable to Mrs.. Muir, and since reasonable minds could 
differ and there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
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inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in 
her favor, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. Steffensen 
v» Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991), 
affirmed, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1992); Penrod v. Carter. 727 P.2d. 
199 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, the MSHA report on the accident which was 
included by Plaintiff in the record on appeal and relied upon in 
establishing evidence of failure to warn remains as further 
evidence requiring jury trial. Argument by Appellees that the 
MSHA report should be construed as concluding that there was an 
absence of respect for the explosives rather than an absence of 
knowledge concerning the use of the explosives should be decided 
by the jury as a question of fact, not by the court in a directed 
verdict. Evidence that the MSHA inspectors may have stated 
absence of respect and absence of knowledge in the alternative 
must be resolved by the jury, and Mrs. Muir is entitled to have 
the MSHA report of the cause of the accident that is in evidence 
as Trial Exhibit 38 and that is part of the record on appeal 
examined in the light most favorable to her. 
The MSHA inspectors concluded that Mr. Muir lacked knowledge 
of or respect for the explosives used by the way that he was 
involved in lighting the charges. Contrary to the argument by 
Defendants that the written instructions and warnings somehow 
explicitly stated that the method used for lighting the charges 
in the present case is dangerous and should not be used, there is 
in fact no such explicit statement anywhere in the written 
warnings and instructions admitted into evidence, there is a 
conspicuous absence of any such explicit statement in the 
materials admitted into evidence, and there is a genuine jury 
question as to whether the instructions and warnings were 
adequate and whether there was a failure to warn that the method 
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used for lighting the charges in the present case was dangerous 
and should not be used. 
Contrary to the argumentative assertion by Appellees that 
the evidence "conclusively" established that it was respect for 
explosives that Bailey and Muir lacked, not knowledge, in regard 
to the evidence that the MSHA inspectors that investigated the 
accident found that the "accident resulted from the total lack of 
knowledge of or respect for the explosives used," (Brief of 
Apache, Page 10), the evidence does not "conclusively" establish 
the argumentative proposition asserted by Appellees, they fail to 
cite to any evidence in the record that would support this 
proposition at all, let alone "conclusively" establish it, and 
this is the very kind of argument that should be made to the jury 
after the matter is properly submitted to the jury rather than 
being erroneously taken away from the jury by a directed verdict. 
By bare argument Defendants also assert that the method used 
for lighting the charges in this case was so obviously dangerous 
that they somehow have no duty to warn against the use of the 
spitter fuse method of lighting because is somehow obviously 
dangerous. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the spitter 
fuse method of lighting had been successfully and safely used by 
Mr. Muir and Mr. Bailey in this treasure trove hunting operation 
in blasts prior to the blast that widowed Mrs. Muir. (Exhibit 38) 
Again, because Mrs. Muir is entitled to have this evidence viewed 
in the light most favorable to her, the alleged obviousness of 
the danger also gives rise to a question for the jury that should 
not have been taken away from the jury by way of directed 
verdict. Plaintiff's counsel put his eggs into the defective 
products basket after the directed verdict removed the claim for 
failure to warn, but should never have had to do so in this case 
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and should have been allowed to argue failure to warn to the jury 
and have the jury decide that claim. 
POINT TWO 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE USED AS A MODERN CASE TO HOLD THAT THE 
COUNTY WHERE THE PRODUCT WAS PURCHASED IS A PROPER VENUE FOR 
TRIAL IN A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT CASE. 
The case of Schramm/Johnson Drug v» Cox, 9 P.2d 399 (1932) 
provides that a cause of action in a defective products case 
arises both in the county where the product was sold and the 
county where the resulting harm occurred. Defendants do not 
contest that this case has never been overruled, but try to 
escape its doctrine by labelling the doctrine as dictum and 
discounting the case due to its age. 
The appeal now before the Court of Appeals provides an 
opportunity to set forth doctrine that is clearly holding rather 
than dictum in a modern case that stands for the proposition that 
the county of point-of-sale is a proper venue for the trial of a 
defective products case. 
Defendants have provided no persuasive argument for why the 
doctrine the Schramm/Johnson Drug v. Cox case should not be so 
honored and reaffirmed. By opening a store in Davis County and 
selling products to persons living along the Wasatch Front, 
Defendant W.H. Burt intentionally benefitted from engaging in 
commerce in that county and can and should reasonably be required 
to appear and litigate in the courts of that county. 
The argument by Defendants and the erroneous ruling by the 
trial court that Davis County was not a proper venue for trial 
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should be rejected, and this Court should hold that purchasers of 
allegedly defective products can sue in the courts of the county 
where they purchased the product, which is consistent with 
Schramm/Johnson v. Cox, supra. 
POINT THREE 
IT IS NOT GENUINELY DISPUTED THAT MRS. MUIR'S FAMILY 
PHYSICIAN GAVE A PROFESSIONAL OPINION THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TRAVEL 
TO MOAB, AND IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
MAKE A MEDICAL JUDGMENT CONTRARY TO THAT OF MRS. MUIR'S OWN 
FAMILY PHYSICIAN WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE OR HOLDING A HEARING. 
Since the advent of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the 
appellate and trial courts in Utah routinely include with their 
notices instructions that persons with special physical needs 
should contact the ourt in advance. 
In this case, Evelyn Muir notified the trial court that she 
would not be able to attend trial in Moab, and even provided to 
the trial court a letter from her family physician, a copy of 
which is annexed hereto, in which the physician states that it is 
his "professional opinion that Evelyn Muir should not travel to 
Moab" and that he "would strongly recommend that she stay in Salt 
Lake City" by way of this same letter which was addressed to her 
counsel and provided to the trial court. 
It is undisputed that this letter was provided to the trial 
court well in advance of trial and that Mrs. Muir informed the 
trial court, through counsel, that she would be unable to attend 
the trial as scheduled in Moab. It is further undisputed that 
the trial court denied her request that venue be changed to Davis 
County based on a conclusion of law that Davis County was not a 
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proper venue for trial, a legal conclusion challenged as being 
erroneous in Point Two above. 
A trial court does not have the discretion to incorrectly 
apply the law. The Court of Appeals should reaffirm the 
Schramm/Johnson v, Cox case as set forth in Point Two above, and 
having done so, should further hold that the undisputed fact that 
Evelyn Muir timely notified the trial court that she was 
physically unable to attend the trial of her own case, provided 
the trial court with a letter from her family physician to that 
effect, and was then not present at trial, is sufficient to 
establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
The notifications as sent out by trial and appellate courts 
under the Americans With Disabilities Act to the effect that 
persons with physical needs should notify the courts in advance 
of hearings ought not to be turned into a tool for tactical 
adversarial litigation aimed at preventing litigants from 
attending the trials of their own cases. 
Nothing more was required of Evelyn Muir and nothing more 
should be required of litigants in the future who in good faith 
notify trial and appellate courts of special physical needs as 
they are invited to do under the Americans With Disabilities Act 
notification routinely sent with notices of trial and appellate 
courts of this state. If a Court is going to require more, 
notice and an opportunity to be heard should first be provided 
and evidence should be taken. It was an abuse of discretion to 
require more without providing notice and opportunity to provide 
more and to make a medical judgment without setting a hearing and 
taking evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case should be reversed and remanded with a mandate to 
change venue to Davis County for a jury trial on all three claims 
for relief. 
DATED this /o day of Ap 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
PaniftyPhysldan 
52& South 300 Wert #203 Mumy, Uuh $4107 Idcphone (801) MM881 
09/21/93 
Robert Copier 
243 B.-400 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
It is my professional opinion that Evelyn Muir should not travel to Moab 
as she will not be able to maintain the diet that 1 have suited with ber and 
the additional stress will also complicate her already fragile medical 
condition. She is very underweight and has lost 50 pounds in the last 2 and 
l/!2 years due to continual diarrhea. Requiring her to live in a motel and eat 
in testaurants in Moab will increase her stress and will probably worsen her 
condition. If there is any way to avoid this change I would strongly 
recommend that she stay in Salt Lake City. 
Sincerely, 
Dennis D Harper, D.O. 
B 
